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Gun Crime and Gun Control: The Hawaiian
Experience
Joseph A. Peters,'
Philip J Cookt t
and Jens Ludwigj *
An expert panel of the National Academy of Sciences re-
cently issued a report concluding (among other things) that the
effectiveness of existing gun-control measures could generally
not be determined from the available evidence.1 The panel opined
that the data are incomplete, but more importantly, that it is
difficult to sort out the causal effects of such laws from other fac-
tors that influence the rates of gun crime and misuse.2 Whether
the objectives of gun control-to separate guns from violence,
thereby reducing the deadliness of assaults and robberies-can
be achieved has not been proven. But the stakes are high, involv-
ing thousands of lives and perhaps up to $100 billion per year of
social costs,3 and arguments continue to rage about which ap-
proaches are most promising. In the absence of hard direct evi-
dence, the arguments often emerge from generalizations about
human behavior.
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' See Charles F. Wellford, John V. Pepper, and Carol V. Petrie, eds, Firearms and
Violence: A Critical Review 4 (Natl Academies 2005) ("The inadequacy of data on gun
ownership and use is among the most critical barriers to better understanding of gun
violence.").
2 See id at 2-3 ("The complex methodological problems inherent in unraveling causal
relationships between firearms policy and violence have not been fully considered or
adequately addressed.").
3 Philip J. Cook and Jens Ludwig, Gun Violence. The Real Costs 114-15 (Oxford
2000).
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Regulations on gun commerce, possession and use in the
United States tend to be quite limited. At the federal level, the
main legislation is the Gun Control Act of 1968 ("GCA").4 The
GCA limits interstate shipments of guns to federally licensed
dealers in an effort to insulate the states from each other, so that
gun markets in lax states will not undercut more stringent regu-
lations in others.5 It also establishes record keeping require-
ments for dealer sales.6 Certain categories of individuals are pro-
hibited from possessing a gun, including convicted felons.7 Fed-
erally licensed dealers are required to conduct a background
check on buyers to determine if they fall into a restricted cate-
gory.' But there is a significant loophole in even this modest set
of requirements. People who are not "engaged in the business" of
selling guns are not required to obtain federal firearms licenses,
nor required to abide by the GCA's paperwork and background-
check requirements.9 Gun buyers and sellers make a substantial
number of transactions each year in the exempt "secondary mar-
ket," ° a loophole that may undermine any effects of primary-
market regulations on the availability of guns to teens, convicted
criminals, and other prohibited groups. While some states and
localities have enacted more restrictive gun regulations that ap-
ply to the secondary market, such regulations may be under-
mined by the ease with which guns can be transferred across
state lines."
4 Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub L No 90-612, 82 Stat 1213, codified at 18 USC § 921
et seq (2000). For a general overview of the Act, see Franklin E. Zimring, Firearms and
Federal Law: The Gun Control Act of 1968, 4 J Legal Stud 133 (1975) (evaluating the
effectiveness of the Act); Jon S. Vernick and Lisa M. Hepburn, State and Federal Gun
Laws: Trends for 1970-1999, in Jens Ludwig and Philip J. Cook, eds, Evaluating Gun
Policy: Effects on Crime and Violence 345, 350 (Brookings Institution 2003) (summarizing
the history of and changes in gun control laws).
5 See 18 USC § 923 (setting out the process for obtaining such license).
6 18 USC § 923(g)(1).
7 18 USC § 922(d)(1).
s 18 USC § 922(s)-(t).
9 Consider 18 USC §§ 922-23 (consistently using the language "engaged in the busi-
ness" when describing the obligations of gun vendors).
1o Philip J. Cook, Stephanie Molliconi, and Thomas B. Cole, Regulating Gun Markets,
86 J Crim L & Criminol 59, 68 (1995).
11 See Philip J. Cook and Anthony A. Braga, Comprehensive Firearms Tracing: Stra-
tegic and Investigative Uses of New Data on Firearms Markets, 43 Ariz L Rev 277, 298-
99 (2001) (describing the close link between more stringent gun control regulations and
imports of out-of-state guns); Daniel W. Webster, Jon S. Vernick, and Lisa M. Hepburn,
Relationship Between Licensing, Registration, and Other Gun Sales Laws and the Source
State of Crime Guns, 7 Injury Prevention 184, 188 (2001) (finding that the stringency of
gun sales statutes largely explained the variance in the number of out-of-state guns found
in those states).
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What have these regulations accomplished, and what might
be achieved by enhancing the current regulatory structure in
various ways? Two perspectives dominate current debates. The
"sociological perspective" asserts that people at high risk for
misusing guns simply cannot be deterred from acquiring guns,
particularly by modest gun laws that can be overcome by highly
motivated individuals.12 The "economic perspective" asserts that
even violence-prone people will consider the time, hassle, and
monetary cost of acquiring a gun in deciding what weapon to use
(if any).'3 As with all other markets, these firearm "consumers"
are heterogeneous, with some more determined than others to
have a gun; the logical result is that the extent of gun misuse
will fall as the effective price goes up. Whether or not a particu-
lar gun regulation is effective will depend on whether and to
what extent it is successful in raising the price.
Where is the evidence to help test the two perspectives?
They generate different predictions in the hypothetical situation
where a gun-control measure succeeds in making guns more
scarce: the sociological perspective asserts that the dangerous
people will do whatever is necessary to get their guns anyway,
while the economic perspective predicts that at least some of
them will give up trying to obtain guns.
Efforts to regulate gun availability in Hawaii present an in-
triguing case because these regulations are relatively restrictive,
and because Hawaii is less vulnerable to having those controls
undercut by illicit interstate shipments. Hawaii is, after all, sur-
rounded by a large "moat," so that gun trafficking is more com-
plicated than simply driving a car full of guns across state lines.
A further barrier to smuggling guns into Hawaii is a by-product
of its efforts to protect local plants and animals from mainland
diseases: travelers and cargo are subject to inspection, 4 some-
thing that is of course not true in the Lower 48.
Our empirical analysis of Hawaii's experiences focuses on
two central events within the state. First, we pay particular at-
tention to a 1981 state law that, among other things, enhanced
the state's permit-to-purchase system by requiring a ten day
12 See, for example, James B. Jacobs, Can Gun Control Work?213-14 (Oxford 2002)
("To change the patterns of violence in a violent society will require more than a better
gun policy, it will require changing society.").
13 See Philip J. Cook and James A. Leitzel, "Perversity, Futility, Jeopardy": An Eco-
nomic Analysis of the Attack on Gun Control, 59 L & Contemp Probs 91, 94-101 (1996)
(considering multiple methods of raising the effective price of guns).
14 See Haw Rev Stat § 150A (1993).
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waiting period for permits as well as fingerprinting and photo-
graphing of prospective gun buyers, and requiring that guns
bought in Hawaii be registered. 5 We believe that this 1981 law
represents a significant one-time shift in the state's system of
regulating firearms, one that could arguably have a substantial
impact on gun transfers in the secondary market. We attempt to
examine the impacts of this law on homicide, suicide and gun
prevalence by comparing Hawaii's trends in these measures be-
fore and after the 1981 law goes into effect with observations in
comparison groups of states around the same time. We also con-
sider whether Hawaii was insulated from the wave of gun vio-
lence that plagued much of the rest of the country during the
"crack epidemic" of the 1980s and 1990s,16 and, if so, whether any
differences between Hawaii and other states during this period
could plausibly be attributed to Hawaii's system of firearm regu-
lations.
I. BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION
The empirical study of guns and crime owes much to a semi-
nal paper written in 1968 by Franklin Zimring.17 Zimring's study
provided evidence suggesting that criminal attacks are more le-
thal when they involve guns rather than knives and other weap-
ons. 8 Evidence for this type of "instrumentality effect" means
that, in principle, policy measures that successfully reduce gun
involvement in crime would help save lives.
In practice, the empirical evidence for the effectiveness of
firearm regulations of ownership or sales-what most people
mean by "gun control"-has been meager. For example, handgun
acquisition and import has been banned in the city of Washing-
ton, DC since 1976.19 Washington's gun homicide rate fell after
the 1976 ban for several years, but later escalated to the point
that Washington became the "murder capital of the world" in the
15 Act Relating to Firearms, 1981 Haw Sess Laws 239, codified at Haw Rev Stat §
134. Prior to the 1981 law, the registration requirement applied only to guns brought into
the state from outside.
16 For a general discussion of the crack epidemic and its effect on gun violence, espe-
cially among youths, see Philip J. Cook and John H. Laub, The Unprecedented Epidemic
in Youth Violence, in Michael H. Tonry and Mark H. Moore, eds, Youth Violence (Chicago
1998).
17 Franklin Zimring, Is Gun Control Likely to Reduce Violent Kllings 35 U Chi L
Rev 721 (1968).
18 Id at 735.
'9 DC Code § 7-2502.01 (2005).
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early 1990s, with most of those murders involving guns.2" Chi-
cago enacted a similar ban in 1982, and there too the evidence
suggests little long-term effect.2 The prevalence of gun owner-
ship in Chicago dropped slightly for a few years, but then re-
turned to its pre-ban level and more.22
Optimists in the gun control debate point to studies demon-
strating that in states with gun licensing and registration laws, a
larger proportion of crime guns are imported from other states
with more lax regulations.23 Similarly, a study of Virginia's one-
gun-a-month law found that the fraction of crime guns in other
states that originated in Virginia declined after this law went
into effect. 24 The fact that criminals are forced to turn to alterna-
tive sources of guns as a result of these laws has been inter-
preted as evidence that availability has declined. While plausi-
ble, that conclusion remains speculative because these studies
lack direct measures of the effective price of guns.
The evidence from the Brady Act25 also leaves us somewhat
short of a clear test between the two perspectives. Beginning in
1994, the Brady Act required Federal Firearms Licensees
("FFL") to conduct background checks on prospective gun buyers
and, at least during the first few years of the law, impose a wait-
ing period for handgun sales as well.26 Prior to this point buyers
simply had to stipulate on a form that they were eligible to pur-
chase a gun, leaving open the possibility of what became known
as "lie and buy."27 Yet the Brady Act had no detectable effect on
gun homicides.28 This conclusion comes from Jens Ludwig and
20 The victimization rate for black males ages ten through twenty four in the District
of Columbia rose from 65.3 per 100,000 in the mid 1980s to 512 per 100,000 in the early
1990s. Philip J. Cook and John H. Laub, After the Epidemic: Recent Trends in Youth
Violence in the United States, 29 Crime & Just 1, 19 (2002).
21 Id.
22 Philip J. Cook and Jens Ludwig, Principles for Effective Gun Policy, 73 Fordham L
Rev 589, 609 (2004).
23 Webster, Vernick, and Hepburn, 7 Injury Prevention at 188 (cited in note 11) (find-
ing that comprehensive regulations of the sale of guns "can affect the availability of guns
to criminals").
24 Douglas S. Weil and Rebecca C. Knox, Effects of Lirmiting Handgun Purchases on
Interstate Transfer of.Firearms, 275 JAMA 1759, 1761 (1996).
25 The Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act ("Brady Act"), Pub L No 103-159,
107 Stat 1536 (1993), codified at 18 USC § 921 et seq (2000).
26 18 USC § 922(s)-(t).
27 Brady Campaign to Prevent Violence, Saving Lives by Taking Guns Out of Crime,
available at <http://www.bradycampaign.org/facts/research/?page=savinglives&menu=
gvr> (last visited May 12, 2005).
28 Jens Ludwig and Philip J. Cook, Homicide and Suicide Rates Associated with
Implementation of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, 284 JAMA 585, 588
(2000).
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Philip J. Cook's study of the Brady Act,29 which exploits the fact
that some states were exempt from Brady's requirements be-
cause these states already had sufficiently stringent FFL regula-
tions in place. Ludwig and Cook find no difference in homicide
trends around 1994 between the states that were required to
change their FFL practices as a result of the law (the "treatment"
group) and those states that were exempt from Brady (the "con-
trol" group).3 °
More relevant for our immediate purpose is evidence for the
Brady Act's effect on interstate gun trafficking into Chicago, a
city that is located in a "control" state that was not required to
change FFL practices as a result of Brady. Following enactment
of the Brady Act, the fraction of crime guns in Chicago that had
originated in Brady "treatment" states declined by nearly three-
quarters, which suggests that the Brady Act made it more diffi-
cult to traffic guns from these lax-regulation states into more
tightly-regulated jurisdictions like Chicago.31 This dramatic
change in gun trafficking patterns did not result in a reduction
in gun use in crime, however.32 Once again we lack a direct
measure of gun availability on the streets of Chicago, so it is not
clear whether the apparent failure in this case was the result of
little change in effective price, or a highly inelastic demand for
guns. The former possibility preserves the economic perspective,
while the latter supports the sociological perspective.
A. Economic Perspective
A key component of the economic perspective is the hetero-
geneity of buyer and seller behavior within markets.33 In most
markets, there is at least some variation across consumers in
their desire for a given good. The strength of these desires trans-
lates into what the consumer is willing to give up in order to ob-
tain the good, whether in terms of money, time, or exposure to
risk of arrest-what Mark Moore terms the "effective price." 34 So
long as consumers are heterogeneous in their desire for a good,
such as guns, then the demand schedule for that good (which
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 Cook and Braga, 43 Ariz L Rev at 303-07 (cited in note 11).
32 Id at 307 n 138.
33 For a superb summary of the "economic perspective," see Cook and Leitzel, 59 L &
Contemp Probs at 94-101 (cited in note 13).
34 Mark H. Moore, Policies to Achieve Discrimination on the Effective Price of Heroin,
63 Am Econ Rev 270, 270 (1973).
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relates the total quantity consumed to the price) will slope
downward. So long as the demand schedule for guns slopes
downward, an increase in the effective price for guns should re-
duce use. This decline in gun use may be large or small, depend-
ing on the distribution of consumer preferences (that is, the slope
of the demand curve). Furthermore, some highly motivated
criminals, a group that we would very much like our policies to
affect, will continue to obtain guns despite a marginal increase in
gun price. But the logic of heterogeneous consumer demand and
downward sloping aggregate demand schedules suggests that
policies that are able to increase the effective price of guns will
reduce overall gun acquisition and use by some degree.
Heterogeneity in individual motivation is relevant for the
supply side of the gun market as well. Many guns enter into the
so-called "secondary market"-defined as all sales other than by
FFL, which as noted above are largely unregulated under cur-
rent laws 35-when law-abiding owners legally sell their used
guns. If there is variability across owners in their willingness to
part with their guns in exchange for cash, at a low price we may
expect only those owners least attached to their guns to be will-
ing to sell. But when the price increases, the number of owners
on the supply side of the market willing to sell their guns in-
creases, and so the number of guns in circulation in the secon-
dary market goes up accordingly. Ultimately some of these guns
may make their way into the hands of high-risk people. Put dif-
ferently, the logic of variability in seller motivation suggests an
upward-sloping supply schedule for guns in the secondary mar-
ket, so that increased supply will require an increase in price.
The economic perspective implies that marginal incentives
matter for at least some people, so that, in the aggregate,
changes in policy that affect incentives can also influence behav-
ior to some degree. Support for this general proposition comes
from studies of how people make decisions about drinking, drug
use, sexual activity, driving, and other risky behaviors.3" Of
course, general evidence for the relevance of incentives in other
areas is not definitive proof that the same sorts of behavioral re-
sponses are at work with guns, since, in principle, decisions
about gun acquisition and use could be fundamentally different.
5 Cook, Molliconi, and Cole, 86 J Crim L & Criminol at 68-73 (cited in note 10).
36 For a general discussion, see Jonathan Gruber, Risky Behavior Among Youths: An
Economic Analysis (Chicago 2001).
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B. Sociological Perspective
In contrast to the economic perspective, the sociological per-
spective implicitly assumes homogeneity in behavior. We do not
mean to imply that all sociologists make such strong assump-
tions across all behavioral domains, but this perspective does
figure prominently in debates about gun policy and, as it turns
out, is articulated most often by sociologists. This line of thinking
often leads to an over-extrapolation from the behavior of the
most highly motivated gun users, and a tendency to readily dis-
miss any regulation that could ever be overcome by anyone.
Gun crime is disproportionately concentrated among young,
low-income people who live within disadvantaged urban commu-
nities.3" Many sociologists doubt that dangerous people in dan-
gerous neighborhoods can be deterred from acquiring guns, de-
spite a growing body of evidence in support of deterrence more
generally."8 For example, Joseph Sheley and James Wright con-
clude that for a majority of the inner-city youth they surveyed,
"self-protection in a hostile, violent and dangerous world was the
chief reason to own and carry guns." " As a result, "the percep-
tion that one's very survival depends on being armed makes a
weapon a necessity at nearly any cost."4 ° Note that this last
statement implies an aggregate demand for guns in disadvan-
taged communities that is totally unresponsive to the effective
price, which is at odds with a key assumption of the eco-
nomic/policy analytic perspective. As a result, Sheley and Wright
argue that the strong motivation on the part of juveniles to carry
guns will persist: "until we rectify the conditions that breed hos-
tility, estrangement, futility or hopelessness, whatever else we do
will come to little or nothing ... stricter gun control laws, more
37 Alfred Blumstein, Disaggregating the Violence Trends, in Alfred Blumstein and
Joel Wallman, eds, The Crime Drop in America 13, 29-39 (Cambridge 2000) (tracking the
increase of gun violence in the 1980s and early 1990s in the FBI Supplementary Homi-
cide Reports).
38 See, for example, Steven D. Levitt, Deterrence, in James Q. Wilson and Joan Pe-
tersilia, eds, Crime: Public Policies for Crime Control 435 (ICS 2002) (reviewing the em-
pirical evidence for deterrence and finding its effects non-trivial, though certainly not a
complete explanation of behavior); Daniel S. Nagin, Criminal Deterrence Research at the
Outset of the Twenty-First Century, 23 Crime & Just 1 (1998) ("Evidence for a substan-
tial deterrent effect is much firmer than it was two decades ago.").
39 James D. Wright and Joseph F. Sheley, Teenage Violence and the Urban Under-
class, 4 Peace Rev 32, 33 (1992).
40 Joseph F. Sheley and James D. Wright, Motivations for Gun Possession and Carry-
ingAmong Serious Juvenile Offenders, 11 Behav Sci & L 378, 387 (1993).
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aggressive enforcement of existing laws, a crackdown on drug
traffic, police task forces directed at juvenile gangs.... "
Sometimes law professors ally themselves with sociologists
in adopting this perspective. Consider, for example, the argu-
ment made by James Jacobs of New York University's law
school:
The people who commit such (gun) crimes are often
young, poor and heavily involved with drugs. They may
kill people in botched robberies or for no apparent reason.
They often kill one another. Their stray bullets may kill
or injure bystanders. From their own experiences in juve-
nile detention centers, reformatories, adult jails and pris-
ons, and in the criminal subculture, individuals in this
category have many sources-family members, friends,
gang associates, drug dealers, and professional fences-
from whom they can purchase or borrow handguns. It
seems highly unlikely that any gun control regime could
prevent such individuals from obtaining firearms.42
Under this perspective, if highly-motivated individuals ac-
count for most of the gun violence problem, then any law that
can be overcome by a highly-motivated person is of doubtful util-
ity. For example, Jacobs argues that
While the Brady Law aims to prevent a person with a fel-
ony record from purchasing a firearm from a licensed
dealer, its background-checking system can be circum-
vented by use of false identity documents. Since the
Brady machinery is based on a name check, it is possible
for an ineligible person to obtain a firearm by giving a
false name. Of course, the would-be purchaser has to
show picture ID, but false ID is readily available....
41 Wright and Sheley, 4 Peace Rev at 34 (cited in note 39).
42 Jacobs, Can Gun Control Work?at 216 (cited in note 12). Similarly, Jacobs argues:
Professors Cook and Ludwig suggest, almost in passing, that if the price of firearms
increased.., some poor young offenders would not have the money or choose not to
spend their money on a gun... [B]ut I fear that the demand for firearms will prove
far more inelastic than Cook and Ludwig imagine. Young men, albeit poor, living in
tough neighborhoods will come up with an additional $10, $20, or $30 to purchase a
firearm if they perceive that it is essential to their survival, status, or criminal
opportunities.
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Another strategy for defrauding the Brady system is for a
potential purchaser, who knows he is ineligible to pur-
chase a handgun from an FFL, to recruit a 'straw pur-
chaser' (a spouse, friend, or fellow gang member, with no
disqualification) to purchase the handgun and then trans-
fer it to him.43
The sociological perspective may have its origins in the dis-
cipline's traditional focus on the role of societal forces on behav-
ior, which seems to crowd out the role of individual agency on the
basis of more person-specific benefits, costs and preferences. Pro-
fessor Albert Alschuler has suggested to us that lawyers some-
times adopt a similar perspective as a result of the influence of
Oliver Wendell Holmes, who viewed the law from the perspective
of a "bad man" who would exploit every loophole.'
Whatever its origins, the sociological perspective yields a
very different explanation for why previous gun-control laws
have not had greater effects on gun crime than does the economic
perspective. Sociologists and their allies on this issue argue that
people who are at risk for misusing guns are all highly motivated
to obtain guns and so will invariably overcome whatever obsta-
cles government regulation may put in front of them. The eco-
nomic perspective raises the possibility that perhaps previous
gun laws have had little effect in practice on the "street price" of
43 Id at 106-07. Another example of the logic that animates this perspective comes
from Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's comments in Kuwait in December, 2004. In
response to a soldier who asked, "Why do we soldiers have to dig through local landfills
for pieces of scrap metal and compromised ballistic glass to up-armor our vehicles?,"
Rumsfeld replied "You go to war with the army you have," and "You can have all the
armor in the world on a tank and it can be blown up." Fred Kaplan of Slate articulates
the economic/policy analytic counter-perspective on this issue: "Yes, some soldiers will get
killed no matter the precautions, but the idea is to heighten their odds-or at least not
diminish them-as they're thrust into battle." Fred Kaplan, Rumsfeld vs. The American
Soldier, Slate (Dec 8, 2004), available at <http'//slate.msn.com/id/21110818> (last visited
May 15, 2005). Put differently, armor might not prevent all casualties from improvised
explosive devices but on the margin can make a difference. Id.
44 Our thanks to Albert Alschuler for this point:
If you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a bad man, who
cares only for the material consequences which such knowledge enables him to pre-
dict, not as a good one, who finds his reasons for conduct, whether inside the law or
outside it, in the vaguer sanctions of conscience.
Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv L Rev 457, 459 (1897). Alschuler
describes the influence of Holmes's argument on his own thinking about the law: "Mon-
tesquieu called his classic eighteenth-century study The Spirit of the Laws, yet some-
where along the way I had ingested Holmes's The Spirit of the Loopbole." Albert W. Al-
schuler, Law Without Values.- The Lie, Work, and Legacy of Justice Holmes 146-47
(Chicago 2000).
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guns, due to the secondary market loophole in the existing regu-
latory system, the ease of interstate gun trafficking, or some
other reason.
Two of the authors, Philip J. Cook and Jens Ludwig, provide
evidence in support of the economic perspective in two recent
studies concerning the effects of the prevalence of gun ownership
on gun misuse. In the first, we find that the frequency with
which male teens carried guns was closely related to gun preva-
lence in their communities, other things being equal.45 In the
second we demonstrate that changes in gun prevalence in a
community are closely linked to changes in homicide and gun
homicide rates.46 In both cases we speculate that the link be-
tween prevalence and misuse is availability-that guns are more
readily available to youths and violent criminals when they are
prevalent, and that availability is important to weapon choice.47
The rest of this paper seeks to provide an empirical test of
these two competing visions by examining the efficacy of local
gun laws in a state that has natural protection from the problem
of gun trafficking: Hawaii. Unlike jurisdictions such as Chicago
or Washington, DC, where the technology of gun trafficking is as
simple as driving a car full of guns across state lines, interstate
trafficking into Hawaii requires navigating thousands of miles of
ocean via plane or boat, followed by a vigorous system of inspect-
ing passengers and cargo implemented by the state to prevent
the spread of diseases from foreign plants and animals.' Under
the economic perspective, the high costs of gun trafficking into
Hawaii compared to other states could plausibly make Hawaii's
gun laws more effective than those enacted in other states. Those
who adopt the sociological perspective will be doubtful of this
proposition because motivated people will find ways to smuggle
guns even into Hawaii.
45 Philip J. Cook and Jens Ludwig, Does Gun Prevalence Affect Teen Gun Carrying
AfterAfl?42 Criminol 27, 48-49 (2004).
46 Philip J. Cook and Jens Ludwig, The Social Costs of Gun Ownership 32-33 (NBER
Working Paper 10736, 2004).
47 See id at 34 ("The most likely mechanism [through which household gun owner-
ship affects homicide] is through influencing the supply of guns to prohibited individu-
als."); Cook and Ludwig, 42 Criminol at 49 (cited in note 45) ("The nature of that causal
influence [community gun ownership on adolescent involvement with guns] is not identi-
fied by the statistical results, but it seems plausible.").
48 See Haw Rev Stat § 150A (setting out Hawaii's extensive quarantine laws).
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II. HAWAII'S FIREARM REGULATORY SYSTEM
Hawaii's geographic isolation makes its gun supply regula-
tions uniquely difficult to overcome compared to those in other
states. This circumstance motivates our choice to focus in the
following discussion on laws that cover the supply side rather
than demand side of the gun market.49 Hawaii's supply-side
regulations have been unusually restrictive compared to other
states dating back to the 1930s, when Hawaii was a U.S. terri-
tory rather than a full-fledged state.5" Given the crime data that
we have available to us (back to 1970) and our empirical ap-
proach, both of which are discussed in detail below, our main
focus will be on changes to Hawaii's gun laws that occurred dur-
ing the past several decades.
Table 1, taken from our examination of the archives of Ha-
waiian state statues from 1955 until the present, summarizes
the history of Hawaii's gun regulations.51 Table 2 provides a brief
summary of how key Hawaii firearm laws compare to federal
law. The two tables together show that before 1970, Hawaii re-
quired that all handgun purchasers obtain a permit. This re-
quirement applied to both primary market sales (by FFL) and for
sales made in the secondary market as well. However, the force
of these requirements is questionable, given that they include no
formal waiting period required to conduct such checks and there
is no specific punishment specified for selling to someone without
a permit.
Our reading of Hawaii's firearms laws suggests that the
most significant change in the state's regulatory system occurred
49 Demand-side laws would include measures that, for example, allow for sentence
enhancements when a gun is used in crime. We do not expect such laws to have a greater
effect in Hawaii than in other states.
50 See Table 1 (presenting an overview of Hawaii's firearm laws over the past seventy
years).
51 The information shown in Table 1 is taken from three separate sources. The Ha-
waii Revised Statutes is released every 6-12 years and contains the state statutes of
Hawaii consolidated, revised, and annotated, at that point in time. The versions used in
this timeline are 1968, 1976, 1988, and 2003. See Haw Rev Stat § 134 (1968); Haw Rev
Stat § 134 (1976); Haw Rev Stat § 134 (1998); Haw Rev Stat § 134 (2003). The timeline
also draws upon the annual Session Laws of Hawaii. The session laws are the annual
laws of Hawaii passed by the state legislature. Each new version of the Hawaii Revised
Statutes takes the previous version, assimilates the annual session laws, and provides a
complete revision of the state statutes. This timeline takes into account the broad revised
statutes as well as the individual annual Acts of the state legislature in order to attempt
to provide a thorough timeline. The timeline also draws on information from personal
interviews with officials at the local Hawaii police departments as well as the Attorney
General's office.
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with the 1981 Session Laws.52 Starting in mid-1981, Hawaii re-
quired a waiting period (ten days) for permits to purchase as well
as mandatory fingerprinting and photographing of the prospec-
tive purchaser and permission for sellers to access mental-illness
records.53 The law also required for the first time that a permit
be acquired to purchase long guns, and that all newly purchased
firearms be registered with the state, and not just guns brought
into the state from outside as in previous legislation.54 The law
did not appear to require the registration of firearms already in
circulation.5
What might this 1981 change in firearm laws accomplish?
While many gun purchasers and sellers may ignore the law's
new requirements, we expect that the cost to buyers of acquiring
a handgun in either the primary or secondary markets should
increase, at least on average. Buyers now are either forced to
wait ten days to acquire a permit or violate the law and ignore
the state's background check requirement, which increases the
legal risk associated with acquiring a gun. Similarly, the re-
quirement that a buyer's gun be registered with the state, and
that the buyer be fingerprinted and photographed, imposes di-
rect paperwork costs and discourages acquisition of the gun for
use in crime. Assuming that there is heterogeneity in the motiva-
tion of gun users, the combination of a waiting period, back-
ground check, and paperwork is likely to affect the purchasing
decisions of at least some individuals with criminal intent.
In short, we might expect that the 1981 law change could
reduce, to some degree, the number of new and used guns ac-
quired in Hawaii's primary and secondary gun markets, al-
though the law should have little effect on the existing stock of
guns because there is no registration or other requirements im-
posed on current owners. Note that we might also expect some
effect on suicides to the extent to which the new waiting period
helps facilitate identification of potential buyers who are ineligi-
ble on the basis of their prior mental health history,5" or more
generally helps deter those who are under the sway of a powerful
but fleeting suicidal impulse.
52 1981 Haw Sess Laws 239.
63 Id.
5 Id.
5 Private telephone conversation between Joseph Peters and Paul Perrone, Chief of
Research and Statistics at the Hawaii Attorney General's office (October 2004).
56 See 1981 Haw Sess Laws 239, codified at Haw Rev Stat § 134-7(c).
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III. DATA
The estimates presented below are based on annual state-
level data for 1970 to 1999. Our key outcome measures include
state homicide and suicide rates (both also broken down sepa-
rately by gun involvement) obtained from the Vital Statistics
system, which is based on a census of death certificates in the
U.S. maintained by the National Center for Health Statistics.57
We focus on deaths of people by state of occurrence, rather than
state of residence. For most states the distinction between the
two is minor, although for states that receive a large number of
tourists (such as Hawaii) the distinction can be more pro-
nounced. We believe that deaths by state of occurrence provide a
more accurate measure of a given state's overall violence prob-
lem.
Another measure of interest is the prevalence of gun owner-
ship within a state. Given that Hawaii does not require that all
guns be registered, even after the 1981 law, we cannot measure
gun prevalence from official government data on gun ownership.
With only a few exceptions, most surveys of gun ownership are
intended to be representative at the national (not state) level,
and so cannot support state-specific estimates for gun ownership
rates. We instead measure the prevalence of gun ownership in
Hawaii and other states using the best available proxy: the pro-
portion of suicides that involve a firearm ("FSS"). Professors
Deborah Azrael, Philip J. Cook, and Matthew Miller have shown
this proxy to be highly correlated with gun ownership rates
across states at a point in time.58 Professors Philip J. Cook and
Jens Ludwig have also shown this proxy to be highly correlated
with changes within states over time in gun prevalence.5 9
We also track annual robbery and burglary rates to account
for other criminogenic conditions that may affect the overall vol-
ume of crime and violence within a state. Burglary and robbery
rates come from the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Uniform
Crime Report ("UCR") system.6" We also draw on state level data
57 Vital Statistics, United States Department of Health and Human Services Mortal-
ity Detail Files, available at <http://wonder.cdc.gov> (last visited May 13, 2005).
58 Deborah Azrael, Philip J. Cook, and Matthew Miller, State and Local Prevalence of
Firearms Ownership: Measurement, Structure, and Trends, 20 J Quantitative Criminol
43, 56 (2004) ("Of the readily computed proxies for the prevalence of gun ownership, one,
the percentage of suicides committed with a gun, performs consistently better than the
others in cross-section comparisons.").
59 Cook and Ludwig, The Social Costs of Gun Ownership at 13-14 (cited in note 46).
60 United States Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform
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for the percent of a state's population that is urban, living in
poverty, and is African-American, obtained from the Census Bu-
reau.6 Because these variables come from the decennial census,
we linearly interpolate data for inter-censal years. Descriptive
statistics for our data are presented in Table 3.
IV. RESULTS
Social scientists define the causal impact of some policy in-
tervention on a jurisdiction like Hawaii as the difference between
some outcome measure of interest (e.g. the homicide or suicide
rate) that the state experiences after the policy intervention is
implemented and the outcome the state would have experienced
absent the law. The challenge for policy analysts is that in real-
ity we cannot observe this latter counter-factual outcome; given
that Hawaii enacted a new gun control law in 1981, we can only
observe homicide rates in Hawaii in 1982 with that law in place,
and cannot directly observe what would have happened in Ha-
waii that year had the law not been enacted. Causal inference
thus requires that analysts estimate what the state's outcomes
would have been under this counterfactual scenario, which in
this case we attempt to do using data from other states.
How should we choose which states to use to estimate coun-
terfactual outcomes for Hawaii, and how do we know whether
our choice is reasonable? One criterion for answering these ques-
tions is to choose a set of comparison states for Hawaii that ex-
perience similar levels of criminal activity (especially with re-
spect to gun violence) or, at least, trends in outcomes for criminal
activity before Hawaii enacted its policy intervention of interest.
If, after all, we expect our comparison states to provide a valid
estimate for what would have happened after Hawaii changed its
gun laws, then at the very least we should expect the outcomes
in such states to look similar to Hawaii beforehand.
Our analysis suggests that different combinations of West-
ern states may provide a reasonable estimate for what would
have happened in Hawaii during the 1980s and 1990s absent any
changes in the state's firearm regulations. Table 4 shows that
Crime Reports for the United States, 1961-1999. Electronic data from the Inter-
University Consortium on Political and Social Research, University of Michigan, avail-
able at <http://www.icpsr.umich.edu> (last visited May 13, 2005).
61 United States Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States 2004-05,
Table 21 (percent of population that is African-American, by state); Table 688 (percent of
population that is living in poverty, by state); Table 25 (percent of population that is
living in an urban environment, by state).
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during the 1970s Hawaii's rates of homicide, including gun homi-
cide, are quite similar to those in two groups of states: a combi-
nation of Washington, Alaska, and Oregon, which we will refer to
as the "West Coast" group, and a combination of Washington,
Oregon, Arizona, and Colorado which we will refer to as the
"West Region."62 These two groups of states are much more simi-
lar to Hawaii during the 1970s with respect to homicide rates
than is the U.S. as a whole, which is also true for rates of other
crimes such as robbery and burglary. Unfortunately, none of
these groups of states seems to mirror Hawaii's experience with
suicide during the 1970s very well, as seen in Table 5 (discussed
more below). We are thus somewhat more confident in our ability
to learn something about any of the impacts of Hawaii's gun
regulations on homicide than on suicide patterns.
Our main empirical findings are summarized by Table 4.
While Hawaii and our West Coast and West Region states were
quite similar with respect to homicide and other crime rates dur-
ing the 1970s, from the 1970s to the 1980s the gun homicide rate
declined by more than one-half in Hawaii but changed relatively
little in these other comparison states. Interestingly, Hawaii and
these other states experience quite similar changes over this pe-
riod in non-gun homicides, robbery and burglary rates, and our
proxy for household gun ownership rates (fraction of suicides
with a gun, or FSS). This pattern suggests that something un-
usual happened in Hawaii from the 1970s to the 1980s that af-
fected the availability of guns to high-risk people but that did not
affect criminal behavior more generally-something, perhaps,
like the 1981 gun law.63
There are several reasons one might be skeptical of attribut-
ing the large drop in homicides to the new firearm laws. One
possible explanation for the pattern of findings in Table 4 is that
the homicide rates in Hawaii may have been following a different
62 Note that California is excluded from our two candidate comparison groups be-
cause the Golden State had quite different levels and trends in gun violence and crime
more generally during our study period.
63 We also run more formal difference in difference regressions to observe the per-
centage change in all of Hawaii's homicide and suicides measures after the 1981 firearm
laws. These regressions provide similar evidence of a large and significant drop in gun
homicides compared to more modest and at times statistically insignificant change in
other crime and suicide outcomes. These regressions are available from the authors upon
request.
We also note from Figures 1 and 2 that the largest decline in gun homicides for
Hawaii was in the years closest to the implementation of Hawaii's new firearm laws. This
suggests that the decline was not likely due to some other policy implemented later in the
decade.
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trend from the West Coast or West Region states during the
1970s, and so the difference across states from the 1970s to
1980s simply reflects a continuation of this trend. If this were
the case, we would expect that some other policy affected homi-
cides before 1981. But Figure 1 shows that the homicide trend
(as well as level) is quite similar in Hawaii and our West Coast
and West Regions during the 1970s. The results are similar for
gun homicides specifically.64 Further, consistent with the idea
that our comparison groups of states are not as reliable for draw-
ing inference about the effects of gun laws on suicides in Hawaii,
Figure 2 shows that the trends in suicides appear to diverge
somewhat during the 1970s for Hawaii versus our West Coast or
West Region groups of states.
A different concern stems from the dramatic effects of crack
cocaine on crime rates in the U.S. starting in the mid-1980s,
which is thought to be responsible for the increase in homicide
rates observed through the early to mid 1990s.6 5 If crack was not
a problem in Hawaii, then the longer-term comparisons across
states shown in Table 4, which compare the 1970s to the 1980s
across groups of states, may overstate any beneficial effects from
Hawaii's 1981 law changes because crack will be driving up
homicide rates during the 1980s in the comparison states but not
in Hawaii.
Whether crack cocaine was a significant problem for Hawaii
over this period is not entirely clear. Our discussions with local
law enforcement and academics in the state suggest that Hawaii
did not suffer the same epidemic of crack use and attendant vio-
lence as did the mainland. Rather, the sources we interviewed
suggested that the main problems in the state have focused on a
form of methamphetamine called "ice."66 On the other hand, Fig-
ure 3 suggests that Hawaii experienced an increase in arrests for
heroin and cocaine that was almost as large in proportional
64 Available upon request from authors.
65 See Alfred Blumstein, Youth Violence, Guns, and the Illicit-Drug Industry, 86 J
Crim L & Criminol 10, 26-32 (1995) (outlining the effects the drug industry has on the
sources of crime); Cook and Laub, The Unprecedented Epidemic in Youth Violence at 53-
54 (cited in note 16) (citing the explosion of crack use in the 1980s as the most common
explanation for the increase in youth violence, though by no means a complete explana-
tion); Stephen D. Levitt, Understanding Why Crime Fell in the 1990"s: Four Factors That
Explain the Decline and Six That Do Not, 18 J Econ Perspectives 163, 179-81 (2004)
(noting the link between the waning of the crack epidemic in the 1990s and a decrease in
homicide rates).
66 Sources include Katherine Irwin, PhD, Assistant Professor, Department of Sociol-
ogy, University of Hawaii, Manoa, and Michael Hailstone, PhD, Assistant Professor,
Justice Administration, University of Hawaii, West Oahu.
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terms as in the rest of the United States. For example, from 1985
(when most experts believe the crack epidemic began in big cities
along the mainland coasts) to 1991 (the peak homicide year for
the U.S. as a whole), the number of cocaine/heroin arrests in the
U.S. as a whole increased by a factor67 of 2.3, compared to an in-
crease of a factor of 2.2 for Hawaii.
The data summarized by Figure 1 would seem to suggest
that either crack did not hit Hawaii very hard, or that the im-
pacts of crack on lethal violence were muted by Hawaii's system
of gun laws, or some other reason. The figure shows that in our
West Coast and West Region groups of states, there was a pro-
nounced increase in homicide rates during the crack period (late
1980s through the early 1990s) that was not mirrored in Ha-
waii's homicide statistics. These differences seem to be driven by
differences in homicide rates of juveniles, who were more actively
involved in crack distribution and violence than were adults. 8
Support for this claim comes from Figure 4, which shows that
homicide rates during the crack period were generally similar in
Hawaii and the West Coast and West Region for people 25 and
older, who were not very involved with crack distribution or vio-
lence.
On the other hand, evidence arguing against a "crack"
counter-explanation for our findings in Table 4 comes from the
fact that robbery rates across our groups of states did not experi-
ence different trends from the 1970s to the 1980s. In contrast,
robbery rates seem to have surged alongside homicide rates in
the U.S. as a whole during the crack epidemic.69
A final counter-explanation that we consider is the possibil-
ity that some other factor systematically changed violence pat-
terns in Hawaii around the time of the 1981 law. An empirical
test that could definitively rule out this sort of explanation is not
possible. However, suggestive evidence comes from Table 6,
which presents five-year averages (1976-80, 1981-85, 1986-90)
for homicides in Hawaii by circumstance (domestic homicides,
felony-type homicides, non-felony homicides, and circumstance
unknown). The table suggests that the decline in homicides ob-
67 By "factor" here we mean "change as a multiple of the original baseline level," so
an increase of a factor of 2.3 means that at end of time period the rate is 2.3 times the
rate at the beginning of the time period.
68 Cook and Laub, The Unprecedented Epidemic in Youth Violence at 53 (cited in
note 16) ("Young black males... were the primary purveyors of crack in most cities.").
69 Blumstein, Disaggregating the Violence Trends at 14 (cited in note 37) (showing a
strong correlation between homicide and robbery rates between 1972 and 1998).
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served in Hawaii from the 1970s to the 1980s is uniform across
types of homicides given the stability over time in the share of
homicides accounted for by each circumstance category. This
would seem to rule out an important role for law enforcement or
social policy interventions that are designed to target specific
types of violent events, such as a drug war or rampant domestic
violence, and point instead to a more general change in Hawaii's
environment-including, perhaps, gun availability."°
CONCLUSION
What do our results taken together mean? Any case study of
just one state's experience provides limited power to rule out
competing explanations for the effects of a gun law or any other
policy intervention. Our study of Hawaii's experiences with gun
control is no exception, although we believe this exercise is still
of some policy interest given the state's unique geography and
laws.
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives
("ATF") crime-gun trace data show that most crime guns confis-
cated in states with relatively restrictive laws governing gun
ownership and sales tend to have been first purchased from a
FFL in a state that has more lax laws.71 Under the economic per-
spective, this would suggest that Hawaii's gun laws might be
more effective than those enacted in other states because the
costs of interstate gun trafficking are presumably higher in Ha-
waii than other places. On the other hand, under the sociological
perspective, highly motivated criminals and gun traffickers will
simply circumvent the additional challenges associated with
smuggling guns into Hawaii, and so gun laws will be as ineffec-
tive in Hawaii as they are elsewhere.
With respect to homicides and gun homicides in particular,
Hawaii looked quite similar to our West Coast and West Region
groups of states during the 1970s. But then during the 1980s
Hawaii's experience with homicide was much different than
70 The change in Hawaii's gun law in 1981 took effect in July. The sharp drop in
homicides observed in Figure 1 from 1980 to 1981 is not inconsistent with some effect of
the legal change if the drop is either concentrated during the second half of 1981, or if the
publicity surrounding the impending law changed gun commerce, policing, and other
aspects of the environment even before the law went into effect.
71 See Cook and Braga, 43 Ariz L Rev at 304-07 (cited in note 11) (noting the in-
crease in out-of-state guns in Chicago when Illinois implemented the Brady Act); Web-
ster, Vernick, and Hepburn, 7 Injury Prevention at 188 (cited in note 11) (finding that the
proximity to states with weak gun laws increase the proportion of a city's crime guns
originating from out-of-state gun dealers).
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these other states, a difference that is driven by a change in gun
homicides. The change in homicide rates in Hawaii during the
1980s, relative to other states that had similar homicide patterns
during the 1970s, coincides with Hawaii's implementation (in
1981) of a stricter set of regulations governing firearm permits
and sales.
While these case study results are far from definitive, we be-
lieve that there is a case to be made that Hawaii's experiences
are more consistent with the predictions of the economic perspec-
tive than of the sociological perspective. The unusually sharp and
abrupt drop in gun homicides right at the time of the 1981 law is
peculiar. Yet, Hawaii's trend in gun homicides diverges from
what is observed in our West Coast and West Region even when
we compare across decades, rather than just for the five years
around the time of the 1981 Hawaii law, or when we exclude
data from 1981 from the analytic sample.
Another and perhaps more serious challenge to our findings
is the possibility that crack cocaine hit the West Region and
West Coast states but not Hawaii, a fact which might inflate
homicide rates during the 1980s in the former compared to the
latter. While we cannot rule out this sort of explanation with cer-
tainty, the similarity in robbery rates across these groups of
states in both the 1970s and 1980s provides perhaps the strong-
est evidence against a crack-driven counter-explanation to our
findings.
The general pattern of homicide changes observed in Hawaii
during the 1980s relative to other states is consistent with what
we would expect if Hawaii's 1981 gun law had some effect. If this
difference in homicide patterns across states is due to Hawaii's
change in firearm regulations, this would be more consistent
with the economic than sociological perspectives, since the latter
predicts that firearm regulations should have little effect on gun
availability and criminal misuse.
Of course, no case study of a single jurisdiction can hope to
provide definitive evidence of the causal impact of regulatory
changes. Yet it is interesting to note that previous case studies of
other jurisdictions that have substantially tightened their sys-
tem of firearm regulations often show little change in gun mis-
use-Chicago's experiences being perhaps the most noteworthy
example." The fact that our case study of Hawaii shows a more
pronounced change in gun homicides than do studies of mainland
72 Cook and Ludwig, 73 Fordham L Rev at 608-09 (cited in note 22).
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jurisdictions such as Chicago is, given the unusually high costs of
interstate gun trafficking into Hawaii, also consistent with the
predictions of the economic perspective. We hope that the sug-
gestive findings presented here help motivate additional schol-
arly inquiry into the unique natural experiment afforded by
changes in firearm regulations within the state of Hawaii.
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FIGURE 1
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FIGURE 2
Suicide Comparisons of Hawaii and Various Regions




I- Hawaii - United States I
Hawaii and West Region Suicides Trends
-I \ -- -- - -- ------l
'0 -o o '
60 70 890100
year
Hawaii - West Region
55] GUN CRIME AND CONTROL 79
Hawaii and West Coast Suicides Trends
\/-. './. ' I ',. }
- .
60 7 0 80 9o0 10
year
Hawaii West Coast
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM
FIGURE 3























, ., , , Ile , ,0 ll y
[2005:
GUN CRIME AND CONTROL
FIGURE 4
Homicide Comparisons of Hawaii and Various Regions
(Age 25+)
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TABLE 1
Overview of Hawaii's Firearm Laws73
YEAR STATUTES AND DESCRIPTIONS
Pre-1970 Hawaii Revised Statutes 1968 (chapter 134). 74
The pre-1970 statute description is taken from the
1968 version of the Hawaii Revised Statutes. A com-
parison of the 1968 version and the 1955 version re-
veals few substantive differences in state firearm laws
with respect to this timeline. A review of the 1935 ver-
sion yields similar results. In all, little has changed
between the summary of the 1968 Revised Statutes
listed in 1-6 below and previous state/territory stat-
utes going back to 1935.
1. Permit, obtained through the chief of police, is re-
quired for handgun acquisition (purchase, gift, in-
heritance, etc). The permit must be used within 10
days of issuance. Permits are required for both
dealer sales and private sales. Acquisition of
handguns without the permit is punishable by up
to $500 and one year in jail.
2. Registration of all firearms is required when enter-
ing the state of Hawaii. The registration must be
done within 48 hours of arrival. Failure to comply
can result in a fine up to $250.
3. In the case of a private transaction, all firearms
require the signature of the seller and the buyer
as well as information on the firearm itself for a
complete application. This may or may not have an
impact on limiting felon acquisition on firearms.
4. It is unlawful for persons under the age of 20 to ac-
quire any firearm, punishable by up to $500 and
one year in jail.
5. Ownership of firearms and ammunition by fugitives,
persons convicted of violent crimes, or drugs is
unlawful. Punishable by up to $1000 and one year
in jail.
1968 Session Laws of Hawaii Act 19 (approved April 30,
1968).75
An act was passed in the 1968 legislature indicating
an increase in crimes involving firearms. The act pun-
ished those who knowingly gave, sold, or lent a fire-
73 All current Hawaii firearm laws are documented in the Hawaii Revised Statutes
Chapter 134.
74 Haw Rev Stat § 134.
75 1968 Haw Sess Laws 19.
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YEAR STATUTES AND DESCRIPTIONS
arm to fugitives, persons convicted of violent crimes,
or drugs. Punishable by up to $1000 and 10 years in
jail.
This law would have an effect on felons getting guns
by punishing dealers, but it seems to be repealed in
the 1971 law below.
1971 Session Laws of Hawaii Act 78 (approved May 24,
1971).76
The 1968 law listed above is changed and the person
providing the firearm is no longer punished. Persons
with criminal records who obtain firearms are pun-
ished by a minimum of one year in prison, but not
more than two.
1975 Session Laws of Hawaii Act 144 (approved May 27,
1975) 77
Saturday Night Specials can no longer be obtained.
1976 Hawaii Revised Statutes 1976 (chapter 134).7s
The Hawaii Revised Statutes 1976 volume is released.
The 1968 statues listed above remain largely in place.
The only pertinent difference for the purpose of this
timeline is that persons over the age of 18 (not 20) can
acquire rifles and shotguns. Also, persons restricted
from acquiring firearms for criminal reasons are
guilty of a felony if found in possession.
1981 Session Laws of Hawaii Act 239 (became law July 7,
1981, without Governor's signature, pursuant to Ha-
wail Constitution Article m, Section 16).7 9
The legislature made several changes of interest to
the portion of the Hawaii code governing firearms this
year, as documented by the 1981 Session Laws.
1. All firearms acquired by purchase, gift, inheritance,
or any manner, from a licensed dealer or private
transaction; require a permit to purchase (not just
handguns).
2. In the case of a private transaction, handguns re-
quire the signature of the seller and the buyer as
well as information on the firearm itself for a com-
plete application. Pre-1981, allguns required the
signature of both the buyer and seller in a private
transaction, but the law is changed to only require
this for handguns. This law probably has little or
76 1971 Haw Sess Laws 78.
77 1975 Haw Sess Laws 144.
78 Haw Rev Stat § 134.
79 1981 Haw Sess Laws 239.
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no bearing on gun availability, but was included in
the timeline anyway.
3. The permit application requires fingerprinting and
photographing of the prospective firearm buyer.
For the first time, applicants must sign a waiver
allowing the chief of police to access mental health
records.
4. The permit can be issued no earlier than 10 calen-
dar days from the date of application. This indi-
cates the first waiting period for both handguns
and long firearms.
5. Registration of all handguns is required, whether
brought into the state, or acquired via permit. All
guns brought into the state must be registered
within 48 hours (consistent with past statutes),
and all handguns acquired via permit must be reg-
istered within five days of purchase (new statute).
Violations result in a petty misdemeanor.
6. Ownership of firearms is not restricted from just
fugitives, or persons convicted of violent crimes or
drugs. Firearms are also banned for any person
who:
a. Has been committed.
b. Has been admitted to a psychiatric facility.
c. Has been acquitted of a crime on the
grounds of a mental disease, disorder or
defect.
d. Is or has been under treatment for signifi-
cant behavioral, emotional, or mental dis-
orders.
1982 Session Laws of Hawaii Act 168 (approved May 28,
1982).80
Permit applications become uniform throughout the
state.
1988 Hawaii Revised Statutes 1988 (chapter 134)." l
The 1988 revised statutes retain the 1981 and 1982
session laws listed above. Few new changes are made
from the 1981 re-write.
1992 Session Laws of Hawaii Act 286 (approved June 19,
1992).82
1. Several brands of assault weapons are outlawed.
2. Ammunition magazines in excess of ten rounds are
so 1982 Haw Sess Laws 168.
81 Haw Rev Stat § 134 (1988).
82 1992 Haw Sess Laws 286-87.
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83 1993 Haw Sess Laws 215.
84 Haw Rev Stat § 134 (2003 Cumulative Supplement).
YEAR STATUTES AND DESCRIPTIONS
outlawed.
3. Waiting period is changed to 14 days.
1993 Session Laws of Hawaii Act 215 (approved June 10,
1993). 83
No person with a restraining order can possess a fire-
arm.
2003 Hawaii Revised Statutes (chapter 134).184
Most laws stayed the same as in 1988, except those
added in the 1992 session. Some of the penalties were
increased, but most affected the demand side of fire-
arm acquisition.
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TABLE 2
Comparison of Hawaii and Federal Firearm Laws
[2005:
85 See Hawaii Statutes cited in Table 1.
86 Registration for guns brought into the state dates to pre-1970, but registration of
new guns bought in-state starts with 1981. See Table 1.
87 Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, codified at 18 USC § 921 et seq.
88 Id.
89 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub L 103-322, 108 Stat
1796, 1996-2010 (1994), codified at 18 USC § 922(v), repealed as of Sept 13, 2004, by the
Violent Crime Control Act § 110105, 108 Stat 2000.
STATUTE HAWAII UNITED STATES
Permit to Purchase Handguns: pre-1970 No
Rifles: June 24,
1981
Firearm Handguns: pre-1970 No
Registration" Rifles: pre-1970
Waiting Period All Firearms: June February 28, 19947
24, 1981
Background Check All Firearms: June February 28, 199488
24, 1981
Saturday Night May 27, 1975 No
Special Ban
Assault Weapons June 19, 1992 September 13,
Ban 1 199489
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TABLE 3
Descriptive Statistics for State Data90
Full Hawaii West West
Sample Only Region Coast
(All WA, OR, WA, OR,
States) AZ, CO AL
Full Period (1964-1999)
Homicide Rate 8.56 4.48 5.99 4.91
Gun Homicide Rate 5.63 2.05 3.58 2.83
Non-Gun Homicide 2.94 2.43 2.41 2.08
Rate
Suicide Rate 11.92 10.82 15.97 14.75
Gun Suicide Rate 6.73 3.04 9.44 8.49
Non-Gun Suicide Rate 5.19 7.78 6.54 6.25
FSS 55.0 27.9 58.7 57.4
Robbery rate 199.1 102.9 126.9 120.3
Burglary rate 1180.5 1340.4 1420 1352.5
% Urban 71.6 82.9 74.6 69.2
% Black 11.9 2.0 2.8 2.4
% in Poverty 12.5 9.2 11.2 10.3
90 Descriptive statistics calculated from state level data, weighting by state popula-
tion. Statistics measured in rate per 100,000 except FSS which is measure in percentage
of households which own a gun.
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TABLE 4
Ten Year Crime Averages for Various Regions91
Entire US Hawaii West West Coast
Region
1971-1980
Homicide Rate 9.48 6.53 6.25 5.13
Gun 6.36 3.49 3.87 3.10
Homicide Rate
Non-Gun 3.12 3.05 2.39 2.03
Homicide Rate
Robbery rate 201.8 128.4 132.6 114.9
Burglary rate 1389 1702 1749 1604
FSS 53.95% 30.30% 58.11% 56.50%
1981-1990
Homicide Rate 9.04 4.06 6.20 5.27
Gun 5.64 1.52 3.36 2.86
Homicide Rate
Non-Gun 3.40 2.53 2.84 2.41
Homicide Rate
Robbery rate 228.1 111.4 141.5 143.67
Burglary rate 1353 1345 1690 1672
FSS 57.57% 29.46% 59.93% 58.61%
1991-1999
Homicide Rate 8.38 3.61 6.28 4.90
Gun 5.80 1.52 3.98 2.87
Homicide Rate
Non-Gun 2.60 2.09 2.30 2.03
Homicide Rate
Robbery rate 218.3 108.9 132.2 128.3
Burglary rate 1012 1091 1122 1061
FSS 57.06% 25.26% 60.30% 59.53%
91 Descriptive statistics calculated from state level data, weighting by state popula-
tion. Statistics measured in rate per 100,000 except FSS which is measure in % of house-
holds which own a gun.
GUN CRIME AND CONTROL
TABLE 5






































































92 Descriptive statistics calculated from state level data, weighting by state popula-
tion. Statistics measured in rate per 100,000.
90 TFE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM
TABLE 6





Domestic 14.2 9.2 11.4
Felony 11.8 9.6 10.4
Non-Felony 41.9 26.0 31.6
Unknown 14.6 9.4 12.0
Five- Year Average, Share
of Total Homicides
Domestic 21.58% 21.71% 23.36%
Felony 17.20% 21.31% 19.27%
Non-Felony 61.07% 57.72% 58.56%
Unknown 21.28% 20.87% 22.24%
